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I. INTRODUCTION
Aside from the separation of powers, the genius of the American
political system is its federalist structure which allows states to
experiment with differing social policies. But the political system has
failed in its reliance on states to reform a severely broken health care
system. Continued reliance on states to correct the inherent flaws in the
nation's health care delivery system is like the oft-repeated description of
second marriages: they reflect the triumph of hope over experience.
Likewise, state-based reforms reflect a resignation that no federal reform
is likely any time soon, rather than a realistic hope that state efforts are
likely to succeed.
Despite the accolades accorded to the most recent health reform
effort in Massachusetts, it, too, is destined to fail. The odds may be
better than establishing democracy in Iraq, but not by much. Nothing in
previous state-based health reform experiments predicts that anything
short of a national overhaul can succeed. Some problems are perennial
to every state and their health system, including rising costs, a growing
number of uninsured and underinsured populations, troubled Medicaid
budgets, and persistent federal inaction. Despite these obvious barriers,
states have been desperate to expand health insurance coverage.
Governors around the country think to themselves, "why can't we do
that,"1 and since the 1970s, states have designed a wide variety of plans
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to implement statewide health insurance programs. 2  All these efforts
have failed.
This paper will summarize efforts throughout the past thirty years in
Hawaii, Oregon, California, Vermont, Maine, and Massachusetts to give
a sense of the reasons these states' efforts failed and why. We do not
believe that Massachusetts's efforts will be any different than the
previous state-level efforts that generated wide national attention,
accolades, and claims that the new reforms would be successful.
Although the Massachusetts plan has some unique attributes, especially
its combination of new innovations and existing strategies, most of its
components have been tried before with limited success. Taken together,
there appears to be very little difference between other states' plans and
the 2006 Massachusetts legislation.
In this paper, we first summarize the history of state health reform
efforts and discuss why they have not been successful. We then consider
why the Massachusetts effort will not be an exception.
II. SUMMARY OF RECENT STATE HEALTH REFORM EFFORTS
State health reform efforts began almost a century ago with highly
vocal debates in a number of states. None of these states ultimately
enacted legislation, but they set the stage for the current debate over
Massachusetts's and other states' efforts. The strongest forces opposing
such legislation were state medical societies who were simply too
powerful for state initiatives to battle against and survive.
3
Between 1915 and 1920, eight states (California, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania)
4investigated the subject of state health reform with official commissions.
In 1919, New York came very close to enacting legislation for universal
coverage when State Senator Davenport introduced the "Standard Bill."
5
The legislation gained considerable support from the New York State
2. See Jonathan Oberlander, Health Reform Interrupted: The Unraveling of the Oregon Health
Plan, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w96, w96 ("Perennial problems ... and persistent
federal inaction ... have spurred states ... to go their own way in health reform .... [T]hese states
have crafted innovative programs to cover the uninsured ... ").
3. See, e.g., Daniel J. B. Mitchell, Impeding Earl Warren: California's Health Insurance Plan
that Wasn't and What Might Have Been, 27 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 947, 947-76 (2002)
(discussing the California Medical Association's opposition to Earl Warren's California Health
Insurance Plan).
4. Milton Terris, National Health Insurance in the United States: A Drama in Too Many Acts,
20 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 13, 13 (1999).
5. Id. at 13-15.
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Federation of Labor, but was opposed by the state medical society, New
York Merchants and Manufacturers Association, and commercial
insurance companies.6 Opponents labeled the bill as "Bolshevism," and
the bill was eventually dropped.7
In California, Governor Earl Warren initiated three major health
reform attempts starting in 1944. Warren's efforts experienced strong
resistance from private insurers, the California Medical Association, and
the business community. 8 Warren later said in his autobiography, "I had
given much thought to health problems, and felt the necessity of doing
something about them .... I concluded that if anything was to be done
to relieve this tragic situation, it must be a public program, and it should
be based on the insurance principle."
9
Now, state medical associations are strong supporters of expanded
health insurance coverage. What follows are brief summaries of the
major contemporary state health reform plans.
A. Hawaii
"Hawaii is unique among the states for its nearly universal
coverage."
10
To many observers, Hawaii is the only successful state health reform
plan in U.S. history because of its employer mandate. Since 1974,
Hawaii has required that most businesses provide health benefits to their
employees. 1 Many believe that Hawaii's apparent success with health
reform occurred because Hawaii is different than other states. The
climate and geography of the state, as well as its low unemployment rate
and history of comprehensive employment-based health insurance, are
traits considered to be unique to Hawaii. For example, the state's
physical distance from the mainland essentially prevents businesses from
relocating to another state to avoid the employer insurance mandate.
12
Despite these claims of success, Hawaii's reform has a number of flaws,
and 9% of its residents remain uninsured. 3
6. Id. at 13-14.
7. Id. at 15.
8. Mitchell, supra note 3, at 947-76.
9. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 186-87 (1977).
10. Suzanne Rotwein et al., Medicaid and State Health Care Reform: Process, Programs, and
Policy Options, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 105, 108 (1995).
II. LAWRENCE MIIKE, HEALTH INSURANCE: THE HAWAII EXPERIENCE, U.S. CONGRESS
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY 10 (1993).
12. Id. at 33.
13. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
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The history of health insurance coverage in Hawaii began in the
1930s with the sugar and pineapple industries, which provided
employees with medical care, through dispensaries, hospitals, and
salaried doctors. In 1938, the Hawaii Medical Service Association was
formed, and social workers and teachers enrolled in the insurance plan.
The plan covered surgery, maternity care, and hospital services.
4
Beginning in 1946, unions struck for health coverage, but it took until
1974 to enact the health reform bill.' 5 The Hawaii Prepaid Health Care
Act (PHCA) passed in June 1974 despite opposition from the Hawaii
Medical Association and the Health Insurance Association of America.,
6
As a compromise, the final draft of the bill included a clause that
terminated the state program once a federal law was passed.'
7
In 1983, Hawaii became the first and only state to receive an
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) waiver because
ERISA was passed a few months after Hawaii's act.' 8 ERISA preempts
state laws, including legislation that relates to an employee benefit plan.
Although ERISA does not preempt state insurance regulations, it
exempts employee benefit plans from state insurance laws.' 9 The ERISA
waiver allowed Hawaii to require employers to offer health care
coverage to employees who work more than twenty hours a week.
Currently, Hawaii is the only state to successfully implement an
employer mandate. 0
In 1993, Hawaii received a Section 1115 waiver for a
demonstration project, Hawaii QUEST (Quality care, ensuring Universal
access, Encouraging efficient utilization, Stabilizing costs, and
Transforming the way health care is provided to clients). QUEST aimed
INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2005 27 (2006),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p60-23 i.pdf.
14. MIKE, supra note 11, at 6.




19. Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, ERISA Litigation and Physician Autonomy, 283 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 921, 922 (2000).
20. MIIKE, supra note 11, at 5.
21. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to waive Medicaid rules to allow Medicaid demonstration projects. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (a)(1)
(2000). Under the waiver, state Medicaid programs can use federal matching funds in ways
typically not approved. Id. § 1315(a)(2). States can expand coverage to those individuals not
traditionally covered by Medicaid, provide services not covered by Medicaid, or change the delivery
system. Demonstration projects are typically approved for a five-year period, during which they are
expected to be budget neutral. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Research &
Demonstration Projects-Section 1115, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGl/
03_Research&DemonstrationProjects-Sectionl I 15.asp (last visited Apr. 16, 2007).
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to provide coverage to uninsured and underinsured populations without
access to employer-sponsored coverage. 22 In the early 1990s, Hawaii's
Medicaid costs increased over 80%, and QUEST sought to save money
by shifting enrollees from public Medicaid to private managed care.23
Hawaii also offers a limited benefits package for adults with incomes up
to 300% of federal poverty level (FPL) who have lost Medicaid
eligibility.24 Even with these efforts, there are reports that QUEST has
had an overall negative impact on community health centers because of
cutbacks in funding and services.25
There are a number of reasons why Hawaii's attempt at health
reform will continue to disintegrate in the future. Hawaii, like the rest of
the nation, is faced with a growing number of uninsured patients, as well
as health care and insurance costs that are spiraling out of control.26 One
problem with the plan is a low compliance rate and poor enforcement of
the employer mandate. Another problem is the fact that the PHCA is
fixed in time and cannot be altered because the ERISA waiver restricts
changing the law.27 This is a problem because the cost of providing
health insurance to employees is constantly rising and shows no sign of
slowing. Hawaii is faced with the question of whether it has the capacity
to handle the costs of the program and how it will deal with the
uninsured population.
28
B. Oregon Health Plan
"The Oregon Health Plan [(OHP)] gained national attention by
changing the focus of health care from who is covered to what is
covered.,
29
22. Rotwein et al., supra note 10, at 108-09.
23. Annette Gardner & Deane Neubauer, State Report: Hawaii's Health QUEST, 14 HEALTH
AFF. 300, 300 (1995).
24. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration,
Hawaii Medicaid & s-Chip Eligibility, http://www.hrsa.gov/reimbursement/states/Hawaii-Eligibility.
htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).
25. Gardner & Neubauer, supra note 23, at 302-03.
26. See Health Trends in Hawaii: A Profile of the Health Care System, Health Market-
Uninsured, http://www.healthtrends.org/healthmarketUninsured.aspx (last visited Mar. 6, 2007)
(summarizing the issues facing Hawaii and its uninsured population).
27. GWEN N. OUYE-NAKAMA, THE HAWAII UNINSURED PROJECT, A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
OF HAWAII'S PREPAID HEALTH CARE ACT 4-5 (2004), available at http://www.
healthcoveragehawaii.org/pdf/PHCA%20Historical%2OBrief.pdf.
28. Id. at 6.




In the late 1980s, Oregon was one of the states that decided not to
wait for national health reform. When it became evident that national
reform was unlikely, Oregon took its own initiative and created what
policymakers believed to be an innovative reform strategy.30 At the time,
Oregon faced a 17% uninsured rate-which was much higher than the
national average-as well as constantly rising health care costs. 3 1 In
1989, Oregon enacted a series of health reforms to provide affordable
universal health insurance coverage for its residents.32 One element of
the reforms included an employer mandate, which never went into
effect.33 Another aspect, and the element that gained the most attention,
was the coupling of a Medicaid expansion with limits on covered health
services. 34 Like the other reform efforts under discussion, Oregon's
efforts failed.
In 1989, when the OHP was introduced, it was considered unique
among state health plans because of a feature that involved ranking the
health services that Medicaid would cover-the prioritized list.35 To
develop the prioritized list, an eleven-member Health Services
Commission reviewed medical outcomes data, heard expert testimony,
and held community meetings to weigh the cost and clinical
effectiveness of each medical service to determine its net benefit.
36
Oregon's unique system replaced a system that included a
comprehensive benefits package with one that limited available benefits
in order to cover more people.37 The resulting rationing program was a
nationally debated and controversial topic; Oregon's section 1115 waiver
was not approved until 1993.3
Along with the prioritized list, Oregon expanded Medicaid to
individuals with incomes up to 100% of FPL.39 Oregon's program also
expanded eligibility and utilization of managed care plans, hoping to
cover 120,000 additional people with incomes up to 100% of FPL.40 The
OHP was initially funded through a tobacco tax. In 2002, the state
30. Howard Leichter, Obstacles to Dependent Health Care Access in Oregon: Health
Insurance or Health Care?, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L., 237, 237 (2004).
31. Id.
32. Oberlander, supra note 2, at w97.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Rotwein et al., supra note 10, at 108.
36. Id.
37. Leichter, supra note 30, at 246-47.
38. Oberlander, supra note 2, at w97.
39. Id.
40. Rotwein et al., supra note 10, at 108.
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attempted to expand Medicaid eligibility again, up to 185% of FPL, but
did not allocate new state funds for the expansion.4' To achieve
42sustainability, the state should have further restricted covered services.
As a result of the OHP, Oregon's uninsured population decreased
from 18% in 1990 to 11% in 1996. But the uninsured rate actually
increased to 14% in 2002. 43 By the end of 2006, the uninsurance rate
was back up to 17%, essentially the same as it was in 1993 when the
OHP began." Proponents of the OHP's goal of universal access were
unable to gain political support for an employer mandate. In 2002, about
17% of Oregon's children were uninsured at some point in the year.45
Within a year of implementation, enrollment in the OHP fell by over
53%, and enrollment has been capped at 24,000 individuals since 2004.46
Policymakers instituted a six-month lock-out to those who failed to pay
their premiums. Studies found that, as a result of this lock-out, 72% of
enrollees who lost coverage remained uninsured. As premiums rose, the
benefit package declined, eliminating dental care, medical supplies,
outpatient mental health services, and chemical dependency services.4 7
Health policy planners in Oregon became too ambitious about cost
sharing, which hurt the OHP's enrollment. Within four months of
implementation, enrollment in the standard OHP plan fell 40%.
Reducing the benefit package sharply damaged enrollment, and the
removal of mental health and chemical dependency services was very
dangerous to many clients.4 8 The OHP was a perfect example of the
disparity between policymakers' assumptions of low-income populations
and their actual behavior and preferences, including enrollees' price
49sensitivity.
Budgetary problems led to the plan's disintegration. The recession, a
high unemployment rate (the highest in the nation), and a growing
uninsured population pressured the system.5 ° Stakeholders started to
question the weakening of the plan, and bipartisan support slowly
41. Id.
42. Oberlander, supra note 2, at w98.
43. Leichter, supra note 30, at 242.
44. Oberlander, supra note 2, at w99.
45. Leichter, supra note 30, at 242.
46. Oberlander, supra note 2, at w99.
47. Id.
48. Id. at wl00.
49. Id.
50. Id. at wl00-01.
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withered.5' Today, enrollment is capped, and the benefits package is
very limited.52
In some ways, the most important lesson from Oregon is that
innovative reforms still confront the brutal paradox of serious fiscal
limitations coupled with the public's limited willingness to tolerate
restrictions. Oregon's rationing mechanism was attacked from the
beginning. It is questionable whether the OHP ever had a realistic
chance of success.
C. Massachusetts I
"I am very proud of the fact that Massachusetts will be the first state
in the country to enact universal health insurance for all its citizens.,
53
"From now on, when the sick land at the doorstep of our health care
system, the first questions of them will be, 'Where does it hurt?' not
'How will you pay?' said Michael Dukakis, then governor of
Massachusetts.54
The 2006 legislation in Massachusetts was not the state's first
attempt at health care reform. In 1985, Massachusetts became one of the
first states to develop an Uncompensated Care Pool to help pay the costs
of caring for uninsured patients, a system which still exists today.55 The
state's first major health reform was in 1988 under Governor Dukakis,
who signed into law the Universal Health Care Law. 56 The plan included
a pay or play provision which required employers with six or more
employees to provide health insurance (and pay 80% of the cost) or be
taxed $1680 for each employee to cover uncompensated care.57 The
employer mandate was later repealed, but the plan included a few
features that remain today, such as Healthy Start and mandated health
insurance for college students.58
51. Id. atwl01-02.
52. Id.atw102.
53. Allen R. Gold, Health Insurance in Massachusetts To Cover All,- Victory for Dukakis, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 14, 1988, at Al.
54. Robin Toner, Health Insurance and Political Hoopla, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1988, at A16.
55. SHARON SILOW-CARROLL & TANYA ALTERAS, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, STRETCHING
STATE HEALTH CARE DOLLARS: INNOVATIVE USE OF UNCOMPENSATED CARE FUNDS 15 (2004),
http://www.cmwf.org/usr doc/784_Silow-Carrollstretching uncompensated.pdf.
56. See Toner, supra note 54 (describing Dukakis's signing of the bill); see also JOHN E.
MCDONOUGH, EXPERIENCING POLITICS 129 (2000) (giving the law that name).
57. MCDONOUGH, supra note 56, at 262-63.
58. John E. McDonough et al., The Third Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access Reform,
2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w420, w42 1.
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As the 1990s recession deepened and medical inflation increased,
William Weld, who opposed the employer mandate, was elected as
Governor. The legislative support for the employer requirement waned
and the law's implementation was postponed several times. 59 During the
years between 1989 and 1995, the number of uninsured patients in
Massachusetts increased from 455,000 to 683,000.60 In 1996, the
employer mandate was eventually repealed.6'
D. California
"The promise is of a new way, a better way, a less expensive way for
small business to buy health insurance," stated Governor Pete Wilson in
1993.62
In the early 1990s, California had the largest uninsured population in
the country-more than 20% of the state's population (6 million)-and
only 54% of Californians were covered under employer-sponsored
private health insurance plans.63 In 1993, Governor Wilson signed into
law the Health Insurance Plan of California (HIPC) as a test of the health
alliance concept 64 developed by several scholars who viewed it as a
market-based mechanism to reduce the number of people without health
insurance. The concept was subsequently adapted for the Clinton Health
Plan.65 The HIPC's primary goals were "to increase [health insurance]
coverage by improving affordability and enhancing consumer choice. 66
At the time, the plan "was the nation's first and largest state-run
purchasing alliance for small firms. 67 It was a compromise measure in a
political environment that has been described as "contentious, partisan,
[and] gridlock., 68  The Governor and legislature were controlled by
59. Id.
60. John E. McDonough et al., Health Care Reform Stages a Comeback in Massachusetts, 336
NEW ENG. J. MED. 148, 148 (1997).
61. McDonough et al., supra note 58.
62. Jill Matthews Yegian et al., The Health Insurance Plan of California: The First Five Years,
19 HEALTH AFF. 158, 158 (2000).
63. PETER JACOBSON ET AL., RAND CORP., STATE HEALTH CARE REFORM INITIATIVES:
PROGRESS AND PROMISE 175 (1994).
64. See Emery B. Dowell & Thomas R. Oliver, State Report: Small-Employer Health Alliance
in California, 13 HEALTH AFF. 350, 350 (1994) (stating that the HIPC "has become a laboratory to
help test the health alliance concept in the Clinton administration's proposal for national health care
reform").
65. Id.
66. Yegian et al., supra note 62, at 158.
67. Id.
68. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 195.
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different political parties and much of their state level health reform was
on hold pending the outcome of the Clinton administration's proposed
Health Security Act.69
The HIPC was the first entity established as a purchasing pool for the
small group health insurance market.7° It gave employees the choice of
their own health plans and was designed for organizations and businesses
with between two and fifty employees. It offered nineteen different
plans, which in the end may have contributed to the program's downfall
because employees had trouble absorbing the differences between the
plans. 7' To participate in the HIPC, at least 70% of a firm's eligible
employees were required to purchase coverage from the pool.
72
Employers were required to contribute at least 50% of the plan's monthly
premium per enrollee.
73
The HIPC failed as a health reform in part because there was no
employer mandate and in part because it was never an employer's
exclusive form of health insurance (as proposed under the Clinton Health
Security Act). Lacking these components, the plan had no noticeable
impact on the cost of insurance premiums, nor did it significantly reduce
the number of uninsured people in California.74 As of the year 2000, the
HIPC still had not captured much of the small group market, with some
estimates hovering around 1%.7 5 One explanation for the demise was a
lack of PPOs in the HIPC; now nearly 40% of employers in California
offer their employees the choice of a PPO.
76
The experiment in California found that a purchasing pool alone was
not enough to lower the cost of insurance enough to increase
utilization. 77  This is important because the 2006 Massachusetts
legislation counts on the purchasing pool to sustain the reform. In 1999,
the HIPC was transferred to the Pacific Business Group on Health
69. Id.
70. Id. at 173.
71. See Yegian et al., supra note 62, at 159 ("[O]ne could argue that the HIPC menu included
more than the optional number of plans.").
72. Dowell & Oliver, supra note 64, at 351 n.2.
73. Id. at 350.
74. Yegian et al., supra note 62, at 164 ("[T]he HIPC's experience shows that pooled
purchasing alone cannot substantially lower the cost of insurance enough to increase insurance
provision among small firms.").
75. Id. at 159.
76. Id. at 160.
77. Id. at 164. See also Elliot K. Wicks & Mark A. Hall, Purchasing Cooperatives for Small
Employers Performance and Prospects, 78 MILBANK Q. 511, 521 (2000) (noting that only the
California HIPC has implemented a risk-adjusted system "that compensates health plans that enroll a
disproportionate number of higher-risk individuals").
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(PBGH), a nonprofit organization and renamed Pacific Health Advantage
(PacAdvantage). Coverage ceased at the end of 2006 when
PacAdvantage could no longer offer choice, in part because Blue Cross
dropped out of the plan.78
One assessment of the California effort noted in 1993 that is still
applicable today, states that "the dilemma with small group reform and
other incremental steps is that they may deflate pressure for more
comprehensive reform without adequately addressing other policy
objectives, namely universal access to health care." 79 The authors added:
"California represents the reality of incremental change that relies on a
competitive market for cost containment, but takes only modest steps




In 1992 Vermont passed comprehensive small market insurance
reforms and was considered a leader in state health care reform. 81
Policymakers believed health reform could be successful in Vermont for
a number of reasons, such as the state's relatively low uninsurance rate
compared with the national average (11% versus 15%), lower health care
expenditures,82 and Vermont's homogeneous, healthy population of just
over half a million people. 83  Vermont also had physician-Governor
Howard Dean as a strong supporter of health care reform.
84
At the beginning, there was considerable optimism that Vermont's
strategy would be successful. But the optimism started to fade following
the passage of Act 160 in 1992, which created the Vermont Health Care
Authority (VHCA). 85  The law promised "'access to quality health
services at costs which are affordable.' 86  The VHCA authorized
regulators to institute a number of reforms including community rating of
nongroup insurance, expanding Medicaid, developing a uniform benefit
78. PacAdvantage, http://pacadvantage.org/brokers/closure.asp (last visited Feb. 26, 2007).
79. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 199.
80. Id. at 173.
81. JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 228.
82. Howard Leichter, Health Care Reform in Vermont: The Next Chapter, 13 HEALTH AFF. 78,
98(1994).
83. Id. at 80.
84. Id. at 79.
85. Id. at 80-81.
86. Id. at 79.
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package and a global budget, and preparing both a single-payer system
and a multipayer system.
87
Despite initial bipartisan support, it became obvious to both sides of
the debate that the mandate was overly ambitious and ambiguous.88 One
of the Governor's most crucial supporters, the business community, did
not support the plan.89 "The 1,500-member state Chamber of Commerce
opposed both the employer mandates and a single-payer system ...."90
In general, there was a failure to convince the middle class that the
program would be beneficial to them.9' The increase in taxes on the
individual family was staggering. 92 For example, "a middle-class family
of four with an adjusted gross income of $60,000 would have seen its
[annual] income tax" increase over 95% from $1909 to $3714.93
Immediately after the story broke in the media, trouble arose. 94 When a
legislative vote came for this "Canadian-style single-payer system," it
was defeated 112 to 29.95
One of the lessons to learn from Vermont's early failure is the need
to convince skeptical interest groups and consumers that health care
system reform is imperative and benefits everyone.96  Explaining the
reform's defeat, Governor Dean said, "'The biggest factor was a climate
of fear among the public that reform was going to cost a lot of money. I
don't think, when it came to the bottom line, many people care about the
uninsured.'
97
87. Id. at 80.
88. Id. at 81 (stating that critics and supporters viewed it as "an overly ambiguous, ambitious,
and politically perilous mandate").
89. Id. at 87-88.
90. Id. at 88.
91. See id at 87 ("The divisions, and evolving anxiety, among Vermont legislators mirrored
those of the general population and interest groups.").
92. See id. at 91 (noting that "[tihe shift to tax-based funding was an act of political
desperation").
93. Id.
94. See id. ("[O]ne key legislator called it the 'moment health care reform crashed and burned
in the House').
95. Id. at 92.
96. See id. at 97 (noting that the failure "to convince Vermonters of the need for comprehensive
change... [was] the major lesson from Vermont").
97. Id. (alterations in original).
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F. Massachusetts II
The Boston Globe reported:
House Speaker Thomas M. Finneran (D-Mattapan) said a 25-cents-a-
pack cigarette tax increase is the most responsible way to expand health
care access in the state.
'It does not revert to the old promises of the past, in which we thought
we could provide health care for all and do it on the cheap,' Finneran
said.
98
In 1996, Massachusetts received a Section 1115 waiver for Medicaid
requirements and initiated another attempt at health care reform.
Representative John E. McDonough introduced the McDonough-
Montigny Bill, known by its official title as Chapter 203, hoping to
restructure and expand the Medicaid program.99 Chapter 203 contained a
number of major reforms including renaming the Medicaid program
MassHealth, expanding coverage for children, and providing prescription
drug assistance for seniors. 00 Instead of an employer mandate, the plan
created an Insurance Partnership program that would offer employee
subsidies and employer tax credits to encourage employers to offer
health coverage without a formal mandate.' 0' Families and adults
unemployed for long periods with household incomes less than 133% of
FPL and children under 12 years with family incomes less than 200% of
FPL would be covered under the plan.'
0 2
The initiative was to be funded with $200 million from the state's
uncompensated care pool, federal matching funds, and a 25-cents-per-
pack tobacco tax increase. 0 3  The tobacco tax had the dual goal of
reducing cigarette consumption and generating revenue for health care
programs. 10 4 The 1996 legislation repealed the 1988 Dukakis employer
mandate-which was never successfully implemented-and replaced it
with the Insurance Reimbursement Program to help small employers. 1
05
98. Shelly Murphy, Health Bill OK'd by House Panel: Cigarette-Tax Plan Draws Weld's Fire,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 8, 1996, at 13.
99. See McDonough et al., supra note 60, at 148 n.6 (citing chapter 203 as an effort to expand
and restructure healthcare).
100. Id. at 149.
101. Id. at 148.
102. Id. at 148-49.
103. Id. at 149.
104. Id. at 150.
105. Id. at 148, 151; AFFORDABLE CARE TODAY, PREVIOUS HEALTH CARE REFORM EFFORTS IN
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As a result of Governor Weld's insistence on not raising taxes or
implementing any new taxes, the plan was underfunded and ultimately
failed.10 6  The tobacco industry "launched an expensive campaign to
block the ... tobacco tax."' 0 7 To gain business community support, the
employer mandate was repealed. 0 8 Although not all aspects of the 1996
legislation were successful, several aspects of Chapter 203 did go into
effect, including increasing coverage for children. 0 9 The Massachusetts
model was later used as a model for the national State Children's Health
Insurance Program (SCHIP). 10 In general, Chapter 203 was a political
compromise that, like each of the other reforms, did not succeed.
G. Maine
Health reform has been a hot topic in Maine for well over a decade.
In 2003, Maine's state health reform, titled Dirigo Health, was signed
into law. It has received considerable national attention and was thought
to be a model of health care reform with its goal of providing universal
access within the state. The reform's objective was to expand coverage
to uninsured individuals, businesses, and municipalities with less than
fifty employees, as well as the self-employed."' The plans were to be
administered through private health insurance carriers and would provide
a comprehensive package of benefits at private insurance market rates.
Hospitals would be required to maintain price lists available to patients
upon request, and health care practitioners would be required to notify
patients in writing of their charges for common services. Dirigo Health
was to be funded by contributions from enrolled individuals and small
businesses, federal matching funds for low-income families (those below
200% of FPL), and $53 million in state funds."
12
According to Stuart H. Altman, a professor of health economics at
Brandeis University, "'Maine has had a fair amount of problems because
it was based on a very questionable idea; it's not going well.'
113
MA, http://www.hcfama.org/act/reform101 .asp (last visited Mar. 15, 2007).
106. See AFFORDABLE CARE TODAY, supra note 105 ("Governor Weld's proposal was seriously




110. MCDONOUGH, supra note 56, at 283-84.
111. See NOW: Maine's Dirigo Health Reform Debate, http://www.pbs.org/now/science/
dirigodebate.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (discussing discounted health insurance coverage
under the plan).
112. Id.
113. Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Could Serve as a Guide in California 's Health Insurance Bid,
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Problems thus far have included a high drop-out rate, a low enrollment
rate, the high cost to taxpayers, and a lack of support from health
insurers. 1 14 The law, which was designed to contain health care costs and
ensure access to all, has fallen short of its initial goal of insuring 31,000
people in its first year and to cover the state's 135,000 uninsured by
2009.115 In the first nine months of 2005, Dirigo Choice covered only
1635 uninsured individuals, with an average cost per enrollee of over
$15,900.116 By the end of October 2006, there were less than 13,000
enrollees. 1 7 Although only 22.4% of those who are currently enrolled in
Dirigo Choice were uninsured at the time they purchased the state-
subsidized insurance,'18 this percentage far exceeds that achieved by the




"I hope to use the coming weeks to convince you that my plan for
comprehensive health care reform is both bold and balanced, far-
reaching and far-sighted," stated Governor Jim Douglas in his 2006 State
of the State address.'
2'
Vermont is another state that has recently undertaken state health
reform with the enactment in May 2006 of the state's Medicaid coverage
expansion titled Catamount Health. The program, which goes into effect
in October 2007, plans to reduce the number of currently uninsured
individuals by offering them the opportunity to enroll in private
insurance plans. The program will provide insurance on a sliding scale
basis for those with incomes up to 300% of FPL. Catamount Health has
goals of achieving universal access to health care, improving quality,
promoting health behavior and disease prevention, and also reducing
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2007, at A20.




117. Canfield, supra note 1, at BI.
118. Bragdon, supra note 114.
119. Wicks & Hall, supra note 77, at 517.
120. See Bragdon, supra note 114 ("Since the Diigo Health reform initiative was passed in June
2003, it has quickly changed from a model health reform of interest to other states to a cautionary
tale of TennCare (Tennessee's failed tax-payer funded, state-run instance program) proportions.")).




costs. 12 2 The new law also includes money to help health care providers
manage and coordinate preventive services and chronic diseases, and will
implement a pay-for-performance system.123 To fund the program,
Vermont plans to increase the tobacco tax.'
24
Advocates of the program suggest that over the next five years, as
many as 25,000 of the 60,000 uninsured Vermonters will be covered.1
25
Vermont's Senate President, Peter Welch, said, "People who are
uninsured benefit and people who are insured benefit. That's the first
that that's happened."' 126 It seems that Vermont goes further than
Massachusetts because its law specifies what is to be included in
Catamount Health Insurance and mandates low co-pays and deductibles,
while Massachusetts leaves those determinations to the discretion of the
private insurer.
Already, a great deal of opposition to the law has emerged, including
opposition from small businesses that will be fined $365 a year for each
full-time employee who is not provided with health insurance. An 80-
cents-per-pack increase in the tobacco tax has upset the tobacco lobby
and Republicans who have already called the taxes "unacceptable" and
submitted their own bills to lower insurance rates. 27 There is very little
in the Vermont bill that suggests it will have any more success than the
original plan of thirteen years ago.
I. Massachusetts 111-2006
"This could become a model for other states," stated House Speaker
Salvatore F. DiMasi 1 28 "Today, Massachusetts is leading the way with
122. An Act Relating to Health Care Affordability for Vermonters, Pub. Acts No. 191 § 1981
(2006), 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 615 (codified as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 1981
(2006); see also The State of Vermont Legislature, 2006 Health Care Reform Initiatives, Quick
Overview, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/HealthCare/2006HC Affordability ActLeddySummary.
him (last visited Mar. 27, 2007) (describing the goals of the 2006 Health Care Affordability Act).
123. Ross Sneyd, Douglas Sings into Law Catamount Health Initiative, BOSTON GLOBE, May
25, 2006, http://www.boston.com/new/local/vermontarticles/2006/05/25/douglas signsintolaw_
catamount health initiative/.
124. An Act Relating to Health Care Affordability for Vermonters, Pub. Acts No. 191 § 1986(2)
(2006), 2006 Vt. Acts & Resolves 615 (to be codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7811).
125. Sneyd, supra note 123.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. William C. Symonds & Howard Gleckman, The Health-Care Crisis: States Are Rushing In,
Bus. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 28, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_48/
c3961054.htm.
1188 [Vol. 55
LET 1000 FLOWERS WILT
health insurance for everyone, without a government takeover and
without raising taxes," stated Governor Mitt Romney.1
29
With no disrespect to the hype surrounding the efforts discussed
above, the new Massachusetts law has generated national expectations
that are nothing short of transformative.' 30 Alas, the reality is likely to be
quite different. In brief, the key elements of the new approach will
combine employer mandates with government subsidies. The details, as
well as critiques, of the Massachusetts law are covered more fully in
other articles in this symposium issue.
1. Individual Mandate
By far, the most controversial and landmark aspect of the legislation
is the individual mandate. The mandate places responsibility on the
individual to obtain health insurance. If an individual can afford
insurance and chooses not to purchase it, he or she can be fined. 13 1 No
other state health reform has included an individual mandate. 132  The
financial penalties will increase up to 50% of the cost of insurance
premiums in 2008 for those individuals who do not report insurance on
their income tax filings.'33
2. Employer Mandate
Employers with more than ten employees are required to make a fair
and reasonable contribution to each worker's health insurance coverage
or else be subject to a $295 assessment per employee. "Fair and
reasonable" has yet to be defined, thus leading to the plan's uncertainty.
Initially, the governor vetoed the employer mandate, but the legislature
was able to override the veto. 34 A free rider surcharge will be triggered
129. Press Release, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Health and
Human Services, Romney Signs Landmark Health Insurance Reform Bill (April 12, 2006) available
at http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=pressreleases&agld=Eeohhs2&prModName=eohhspressrelease&
prFile=pr_060412_reformbill.xml.
130. See McDonough et al., supra note 58, at w420 (noting that "the statute contains novel
elements that have never been attempted in any state, [and] it bears analysis and watching").
131. John Holahan & Linda Blumberg, Massachusetts Health Care Reform: A Look at the
Issues, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB EXCLUSIVES w432, w434.
132. See id. at w432 (noting that Massachusetts will be the first state to achieve universal health
care if all of the reforms are applied).
133. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY





for employers with more than ten employees who do not offer a Section
125 cafeteria plan for their employees' 35 (enabling workers to pay for
health insurance with pretax dollars and purchase insurance through the
connector even if there is no employer contribution to the plan). 1
36
One interesting aspect to watch will be whether employers expand,
maintain, or drop coverage following enactment of the legislation. The
assessment fee is intended to serve as an incentive to offer insurance, but
it could very well become a viable option for employers to abandon
providing insurance. Employers who currently provide insurance may
drop their insurance and take the $295 assessment fee for each employee
because, in most cases, it will be much cheaper to pay the assessment fee
than to provide health insurance. There also may be limited incentives
for employers who currently do not provide insurance to do so, knowing
that their penalty is limited to $295 per employee.1
37
3. The Connector
One of the main aspects of the Massachusetts reform is the
Connector, which will allow groups to purchase insurance. It will also
ensure portability of insurance from job to job because more than one
employer will be able to contribute to the employee's health insurance
premium.'3 8 The Connector will act as a facilitator between individuals,
small businesses, and private insurance plans to ensure that these plans
are of high value and good quality.' 39 Beginning in July 2007, non- and
small-group markets will merge, which will allow them to purchase
insurance through the Connector at rates lower than exist currently.
40
Initial estimates suggest premiums may drop up to 24%. 14 1  The
Connector is a big undertaking for the state not only because it will have
to coordinate insurance plans and approve "affordable" plans but also
because it will assume a number of other duties, including determining
employee eligibility and collecting premiums.
42
135. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 131, at w434.
136. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 133.
137. Id.
138. COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., HEALTH CARE ACCESS AND AFFODABILITY CONFERENCE





142. THE COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INSURANCE, MASSACHUSETTS' HEALTH CARE
REFORM PLAN: TOO MANY STICKS; NOT ENOUGH CARROTS 2-3 (2006), available at http://
www.cahi.org/cahi-contents/resources/pdf/massachusetts.pdf"
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4. Funding
The plan is expected to cost $1.2 billion over three years and will
redistribute existing funding, including Medicaid payments for safety net
providers and the uncompensated care pool. New funding will come
from employer contributions and General Fund revenues. 143 The bill will
use public funds to cover currently uninsured low-income populations
and provide residents of the Commonwealth with more equitable
coverage. 144 Funds will also be raised from the employer mandate and
individual mandate fines. 45 The Massachusetts legislature anticipates
that no additional funding will be required, which will be difficult to
guarantee. Rising health care costs and the limited promise of new funds
suggest uncertainty that the plan will be fully financed in the future.1
46
5. Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Plan
The Commonwealth Care Health Insurance Plan (CCHIP) will
provide subsidized health insurance for households with income up to
300% of FPL. CCHIP will be operated by the Connector, and requires
no deductibles or premiums for those individuals earning up to 100% of
FPL. 
147
6. Why Massachusetts Policymakers Think It Will Work
It seems like the news and commentary about the 2006 legislation is
suffused with support for the health care bill. Hundreds of articles have
been written about how this is a "model system" and how it will succeed.
Other states such as Iowa, New Jersey, Minnesota, and California have
inquired about the Massachusetts plan or drafted bills that were inspired
by Massachusetts. 14 8  Even Senator Edward Kennedy, the incoming
chairman of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and
Pensions, said he would call hearings to explore using the Bay State plan
as a national model. 1
49
143. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 133.
144. CONFERENCE COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 138, at 1.
145. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 131, at w441.
146. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 133, at 2.
147. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 131, at w434.
148. Susan Milligan, Mass. Health Plan Drawing Interest as Model for US: Universal Care




House Speaker Salvatore DiMasi stated, "It's only fitting that
Massachusetts would set forward and produce the most comprehensive,
all-encompassing health care reform bill in the country." 150 Governor
Mitt Romney called the legislation, "Something historic, truly landmark,
a once-in-a-generation opportunity."' 151  The Senate President, Robert
Travaglini, said, "The eyes of the nation are on us .... We led the way
with same-sex marriage, and now we are doing it with health care
reform."' 5 2
Those involved in the Massachusetts health care reform
enthusiastically believe that Massachusetts will be different for a number
of reasons. To begin with, it is a relatively rich state, and with Boston
acting as a major player in a health sector with prestigious medical
centers and doctors, Massachusetts has more resources than most states
to provide care for its uninsured population. More importantly, only
about 10% of Massachusetts' 6.5 million people are uninsured, compared
with the national average of 16%. 153 So far, the measure has support
from advocacy groups and insurance companies. And the legislation was
the product of a political compromise-the individual mandate favored
by the political right, and the employer mandate favored by the political
left.154 That compromise led one critical commentator to note that "[i]t's
a conspiracy of the left and the right."'
' 55
7. Reasons for Skepticism
But the question remains: how different is the Massachusetts plan
from the numerous attempts over the past thirty years from around the
country and within Massachusetts itself? As our review of previous
states' efforts indicates, employer mandates and purchasing cooperatives
have been tried, as have other approaches, without notable success.
What about the Massachusetts plan makes it any different than previous
state-based reform efforts? Indeed, Massachusetts is itself not new to
reform. Both of its major reforms in the past twenty years have failed.
Thus, we are skeptical that this third attempt, which is only slightly
150. Mass. Passes Landmark Healthcare Bill: Measure Requires All Residents To Have Health
Insurance By 2007, CBS NEWS, Apr. 5, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/05/health/
main I 472847.shtml.
151. Id.
152. William C. Symonds, In Massachusetts, Health Care for All?, BUS. WK., Apr. 4, 2006,
http://www.businessweek.com/investor/contentlapr2006/pi20060404_15251 0.htm?chan=search.
153. KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 133.
154. McDonough et al., supra note 58, at w420-31.
155. Milligan, supra note 148, at Al.
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different from its previous attempts, will be at all divergent from the
historical pattern. 156  Although the state should be applauded for
continuing attempts at reform, the efforts in Massachusetts are likely to
mimic the results of other states around the country.
Aside from the historical record, there are several implementation
challenges facing the reform effort. For one thing, its success hinges on
the simultaneous administration of very complex arrangements. For
another, nothing in the law requires that insurance companies provide




One pressing question is whether these plans will actually be
affordable. The plan specifies that the individual mandate can only be
enforced if the plans are affordable. 5 8  Yet the legislation provides
neither a definition for the word "affordable" nor a subsidy schedule for
low-income residents. 159  Legislators have suggested that low-cost
products range in price from $200 to $250 per month. 60 By comparison,
in 2005, the national average monthly premium for an employer-
sponsored insurance plan was $335.161 It will be up to the insurance
companies to determine what they will charge, and it will be interesting
to see if the plans are actually affordable. 162 In all likelihood, even these
supposedly affordable plans will be too expensive for most uninsured
individuals to afford. Another problem is that the law does not require a
standardized benefits package, 163 thus making it hard to compare plans
and to ensure that all health plans will maintain a basic level of benefits.
Already, the premium estimates have proven to be unrealistically
low. The state panel charged with determining both the monthly
premium and the benefits package issued its initial estimates showing
that the average monthly premium for an individual will be $380 for the
156. See generally McDonough et al., supra note 58, at w420-31 (examining the history of the
Massachusetts health care system leading up to, and including, its current state after the enactment of
Chapter 58).
157. See KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, supra note 133, at 2 (noting that






163. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 131, at w438.
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proposed benefit package.164 That figure is likely to be well beyond the
means of most uninsured individuals absent considerable state subsidies.
The Massachusetts health plan is based on suspect financial foundations
with very little cost shifting. Thus, the proclamations of the savings to
taxpayers are probably overstated.
165
b. The Connector
In all likelihood, the Connector will be dominated by high-deductible
plans (including health savings accounts) which will attract a healthier
population. Depending on demand, there simply may not be enough
subsidy funds to pay for all who request them. If the plans offer a low
affordability standard, they will reduce the individual burden but increase
the state burden and vice versa. 166 There is also no requirement within
the Connector for a standardized benefits package, making it very hard to
compare plans.
1 67
c. The Massachusetts Uncompensated Care Pool
Massachusetts is one of the only states to have an uncompensated
care pool. The fund was implemented in 1985 and provides direct
subsidies to hospitals and community health centers that provide care to
patients without insurance coverage.168 One major problem that the fund
has faced is unsustainable funding, resulting in changes in the
prospective payment to and limits on the reimbursement of primary care
services in hospitals. 69  The current legislation threatens the
uncompensated care pool by taking the money from it and redistributing
it toward the other aspects of the legislation.
d. ERISA Preemption and the Employer Mandate
To an important extent, the Massachusetts plan hinges on the success
of the employer mandate. But the ability to implement the mandate is
likely to face an ERISA preemption challenge. It is well beyond the
164. Alice Dembner, Sticker Shock for State Care Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2007, at Al.
165. T. Miller, Massachusetts: More Mirage than Miracle, 2006 HEALTH AFF.: WEB
EXCLUSIVES w420, w45 1.
166. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 131, at w437.
167. Id. at w438.
168. SILOW-CARROLL & ALTERAS, supra note 55, at 15.
169. Holahan & Blumberg, supra note 131, at w433.
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scope of this article to analyze the issues involved in such litigation.
Suffice it to say that Maryland's play or pay attempt, the Fair Share
Health Care Fund Act, to force Wal-Mart to provide health insurance or
pay a fine per employee, was recently struck down. 170 The court ruled
that ERISA preempted the Maryland scheme because it would ultimately
compel employers to restructure their employee benefit plans.
1 71
Explicitly, the court rejected Maryland's argument that it was merely
imposing a payroll tax if Wal-Mart did not provide insurance.
72
Whether the same reasoning will apply to the Massachusetts plan
remains to be seen. At a minimum, the Maryland case raises serious
concerns about the employer mandate's ability to survive the expected
ERISA preemption challenge. If the employer mandate is bound to be
preempted, would the remainder of the plan collapse?
8. Future Prospects
One of the biggest questions about the sustainability of the
Massachusetts plan is enforcement. Will these laws actually stick, or,
like all the other states that failed, will financial burdens, political issues,
and enforcement cause the plan to slowly dissolve? Critics have
questioned whether these changes, even if implemented, are simply a few
"cosmetic nips and tucks.' 73  Keep in mind that the legislation is the
state's third attempt at health care reform. It is hard to believe the result
will be different this time around.1 74 As two critics argued:
Unfortunately, this week's tableau merely repeats one from 20 years
ago when Governor Dukakis was celebrating passage of his universal
healthcare bill. That plan imploded within two years, and today about
250,000 more people are uninsured in Massachusetts than the day it
was signed. Unfortunately, Massachusetts' new health reform
legislation looks set to repeat that disaster. 175
170. Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, Nos. 06-1840, 06-1901, 2007 WL102157, at *15
(4th Cir. Jan. 17, 2007).
171. Id.
172. Id. at *9.
173. Miller, supra note 165, at w452.
174. McDonough et al., supra note 58, at w420-3 1.
175. Steve Woolhandler & David U. Hinmelstein, Massachusetts Health Reform Bill: A False




"Socialized medicine is not the solution to our state's health care
problems," said Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. 176
On January 8, 2007, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger proposed a
package of piecemeal health care reforms through which California will
attempt to cover its uninsured residents. 177  This is no easy task.
California has by far the most uninsured residents in the country-over
6.5 million people, or more than 20% of the state's population. 78 Over 1
million of these people are illegal immigrants. 1
79
The plan is expected to cost about $12 billion a year and would
require employers who do not provide health insurance to contribute to a
fund to pay for coverage of the working uninsured. 180 Physicians would
be required to pay 2% and hospitals 4% of their revenue to help cover
higher reimbursements for those physicians and medical facilities that
treat patients in the state Medicaid program, MediCal. 18' Governor
Schwarzenegger's proposal would also extend Medicaid to adults who
earn up to 100% of FPL and for children of families who earn up to
300% of FPL (regardless of their immigration status). 82 Adult illegal
immigrants would continue to be barred from Medicaid, but would still
be entitled to safety net care. 183 Similar to the Massachusetts plan, there
would also be a 4% tax on the social security wages of businesses that do
not provide insurance to their employees, in order to subsidize insurance
for the working uninsured. 
84
Almost instantly, Governor Schwarzenegger's plan faced serious
opposition from some of his most important allies-physicians, hospital
industry executives, and his Republican colleagues. One of the
proposal's main deterrents is the tax on physicians' and hospitals'
revenues. Ironically, in many cases they are the ones providing services
to the uninsured, often with cuts to their pay and revenues already.
176. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Cal., Governor Schwarzenegger Announces Veto
of Government-Run Health Care (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-
release/375 1/.
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Additionally, even if enacted, the potential ERISA preemption barrier
still remains.
III. WHY PREVIOUS STATE REFORM EFFORTS HAVE NOT BEEN
SUCCESSFUL
When thinking about the potential success of Massachusetts III and
other recent state-level reform efforts, the failed attempts of the past
should caution policymakers not to oversell their approach. Many states
have seen their number of uninsured patients skyrocket, which has
adversely impacted their hospitals, community health centers, and the
health of their state. States have tried everything from expanding
Medicaid eligibility to imposing employer mandates, yet none of the
states' health reforms efforts have been successful. Even the ostensibly
successful Hawaii reform has an uninsured rate of 9% and ongoing fiscal
pressures despite its employer mandate.18
5
"For the States, implementation of health care reform has been a
difficult task. Although the section 1115 demonstrations remain the
most effective way for States to expand coverage to uninsured
populations and streamline the Medicaid process, the actual execution of
reform plans by States has, at times, been arduous."1 86 This assessment,
from 1995, remains equally accurate today. Aside from the difficulties
of replicating experiences across states, there are few evaluations to learn
from in designing and implementing health insurance reforms. That a
state may learn from previous failure may help avoid similar mistakes,
but it provides little guidance for new innovations.
One question to address is why it has been so difficult to make
substantial health care reform gains at the state level. Another question
is whether the Massachusetts plan and the other emerging state reform
efforts will lead to different results. Has the environment changed
sufficiently to provide the means for success?
A. Reasons for Lack of Success
The primary reason why previous efforts have failed is the sheer
scope of the cost and scale of providing insurance for all state residents.
In a word, the task is overwhelming. Most of the reforms discussed
185. See supra notes 10-28 and accompanying text (discussing Hawaii's uninsured population
and escalating uninsurance rates).
186. Jean I. Thorne et al., State Perspectives on Health Care Reform: Oregon, Hawaii,
Tennessee and Rhode Island, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 121, 121 (1995).
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above were reasonably well designed and, in many cases, implemented
as well as could be expected. Yet the results were consistent: none
survived, and very few uninsured individuals received the anticipated
benefits. Almost all the plans suffered from inadequate resources,
whether in economically vibrant states (Massachusetts and California) or
in less economically robust states (Vermont and Maine).
A key assumption in the plans discussed above is that expanding
Medicaid or offering insurance will lead uninsured individuals to enroll
in the new programs. In many cases, individuals may be offered
insurance through their employers, but the premiums are simply too
expensive to afford. As an example, the HIPC failed in large part
because the state subsidies were inadequate to enable low-wage workers
to purchase the coverage.
Equally important, the fiscal climate in the United States is virulently
anti-tax. Few politicians are willing to say that universal health care
coverage can only be achieved with targeted tax increases.
Redistribution of wealth is hardly a winning political platform. In
Massachusetts III, for instance, Governor Romney specifically cited the
absence of a tax increase in the state's plan. Instead, most of the reforms
rely on complex combinations of policy changes. What helps sell a plan
like Massachusetts III is that various segments are expected to
participate. Each change alone might work, but when the overall success
of the plan depends on coordinating several separate policy changes, the
probability of success is greatly diminished. What will happen to
Massachusetts III if ERISA preempts the employer mandate? Can the
plan survive without a key component? Where will the state obtain
alternative sources of revenue?
In any event, health insurance is just one area competing for scarce
state resources. During the states' fiscal crises of the late 1990s and
early 2000s, policymakers were cutting funds for education, Medicaid,
and other social needs. In that environment, it is hardly surprising that
health insurance reforms were inadequately funded.
Many states' initiatives seem to start out strong, but as support
wanes, so does enforcement. For a plan to be sustainable, political
support is necessary throughout the implementation process. Inherently,
health care reforms require difficult compromises that result in plans
filled with broad general reform strategies that essentially postpone the
difficult details. For example, in the 2006 Massachusetts legislation, the
crucial term "affordable" in the connector plans has yet to be defined. It
is easy to camouflage difficult policy choices and tradeoffs in the initial
legislation; this allows politicians to exultantly announce the latest
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solution to the health insurance crisis, while ignoring the inevitable
implementation challenges.
Often, initial support is difficult to sustain and obscures the
consensus needed to implement comprehensive reform. Oregon's plan
presents a good example, especially because other states' plans share
many of the problems that undermined the OHP. Simply enacting
coverage expansions is not enough to solve the problem, given the
shifting political and fiscal environments. For instance, term limits mean
that legislatures lack continuity over time, and a newly elected governor
may not share an enthusiasm for reform. Reforms can easily lose
momentum and fiscal support. Despite the OHP's innovative prioritized
list, the initial political support waned as the realities of rationing health
care, even for state-provided services, became apparent and increasingly
divisive.
Equally important, most states underestimate the actual costs of
expanded health insurance coverage and the ability to control those costs.
Without serious consideration of cost control, state-led reforms will not
be successful. But it seems well beyond the ability of any individual
state to control increasing medical inflation. 87  Several of the state
reforms discussed above imploded over increased health care costs.
To be sure, previous outcomes are more than just technical failures.
In a country that emphasizes individual responsibility over collective
responses to social problems, it is difficult to generate the political will to
distribute resources to uninsured populations. There is, after all, a reason
why Congress has never enacted universal health insurance.
B. Why Massachusetts III Might Be Different
Regardless of its dismal historical record, there are reasons to
suggest that Massachusetts might be different. As noted above,
Massachusetts is a wealthy state with a low uninsurance rate. 1 8 The
legislation's combination of public and private revenue and buy-in from
virtually all stakeholders provides a potentially sound basis for
implementation. One significant advantage the plan has over previous
efforts is that it requires shared sacrifice. From the innovative individual
and employer mandates to the idea of the Connector, the plan goes far
beyond previous state health care reform proposals.
187. See Oberlander, supra note 2, at w96-104 (detailing the failure of the Oregon Health Plan).
188. McDonough et a]., supra note 58, at w430.
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Two other factors should be noted. First, the plan is politically
attractive to both liberals and conservatives. The need is undeniable, and
neither political party can rely on previous shibboleths to ignore the
problem. Liberals are unlikely to achieve reform at the federal level; for
conservatives, the market is unlikely to resolve the problem. Thus, the
time may be right for state policymakers to make health reform work and
to avoid the implementation barriers encountered elsewhere. Second,
Massachusetts has the policy expertise to implement and evaluate the
program.
Yet even if Massachusetts III is successful, extrapolating from
Massachusetts to other states will be challenging to say the least. The
conditions that argue for a successful outcome in Massachusetts are
largely absent in other states. A further concern is the possibility that
ERISA preemption will undermine key elements that are needed for state
reforms to be successful. But at least the components of a successful
program may be evaluated and understood.
C. Why It Is Necessary to Keep Trying
If the historical record is dismal and the chances of sustainable state-
level health care reform are remote, why bother with it? To begin with,
the need continues to increase and some people will be helped. 89 That is
better than nothing.190 For those who do not believe national insurance
can succeed in the United States as it has in other countries, incremental,
state-led reform may be the best option.
Probably the most important reason to support state-based efforts is
that the federal government is not likely to enact universal health care
any time soon. Even though health care reform is already on the 2008
presidential campaign agenda, there are many reasons to doubt
significant action. For those who think the time is right, remember back
to 1994 when the political environment seemed propitious for enacting
the Clinton Administration's Health Security Act. When the middle
class refused to compromise on coverage, the Act collapsed. Today we
are in a similar situation.
Another reason to pursue state-level efforts is that some experiments
may work, or at least we will learn what does not work. Take
Massachusetts III, for example. One way or the other, valuable
189. Peter D. Jacobson et al., Survival Strategies for Michigan's Health Care Safety Net
Providers, 40 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 923, 938 (2005).
190. Id.
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information will emerge on the viability of individual and employer
mandates. If they work, we can certainly anticipate such mandates
diffusing rapidly to other states. If not, states will have reason to explore
other policy options.
One difference from the historical trend is that most previous state
efforts have come in isolation from one another. Arguably, the current
environment represents a policy cascade,' 9' with several states
simultaneously attempting significant health care reforms. Whether a
critical mass of state-level efforts will yield different results remains to
be seen. But the cascade could well create a better environment, shared
knowledge, and a dynamic for change. In particular, if the emerging
policy cascade proves to be a populist response to perceived federal and
state inaction on a wide variety of domestic policy concerns, the current
environment could be a departure from past promises and from
replicating previous failures.
Finally, federalism matters. For better or worse (to return to the
marriage metaphor), we are stuck with state-level options in the absence
of national health insurance. If government is responsible for ensuring
some level of access to health care for uninsured populations, federal
uniformity may be desirable, but states should also experiment with
various approaches and policy alternatives until Congress acts. The
federalism question is paramount for discussing access to health care. If
health care is considered to have fundamental moral importance, it
should arguably be available to all, regardless of where they live. For the
foreseeable future, however, health care will not be available to all. As
such, the burden falls on those states that are willing to accept the
responsibility of caring for their own citizens. The number of states now
willing to address the needs of their uninsured populations is
encouraging and may put pressure on other states and the federal
government to finally accept responsibility. Indeed, a lingering question
remains-when does an issue that states have been unable to solve
become a national problem?
Our skepticism about the current cascade is the twenty years of
consistent failure documented above. Maybe another round of reforms
will be successful, but if history repeats itself, or even somewhat mimics
itself, it is most likely that we will be in the same place in ten years,
writing about such and such plan that failed. Each of the states discussed
in this paper was initially optimistic, saying "We will be different
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because . . . ." Every state that has attempted health insurance reform
said "we are different" or "unique" or that this will be a "model for other
states."
Yet the same states that initiated health reforms with great fanfare in
the early 1990s are back again, with states like Minnesota and
Washington requesting information about the Massachusetts health
reform plan for implementation in their states. For the most part, the
same states that are now interested in developing reforms are the ones
that attempted reforms beginning twenty years ago. The current efforts
should be applauded. At the same time, it is impossible to assume that
anything substantial will happen with a series of piecemeal reforms,
which in the end do not fix the problems that our health care system is
facing. With rising costs and an ever-shrinking middle class, something
radical will need to take place, including addressing health care cost
increases. For significant change to take place, we need federal reform.
Without federal action, it is unlikely that there will be a significant
reduction in the growth of the uninsured population.
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